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Legislation & Regulation
and
Reform of the First Year
John F. Manning and Matthew Stephenson
This essay discusses the development of a Legislation and Regulation
course as part of a 1L curriculum reform that the Harvard Law School faculty
unanimously adopted in 2006. The reform was adopted following three years
of work by a Committee on Educational Innovations appointed by then-Dean
Elena Kagan and chaired by future Dean Martha Minow. The Legislation and
Regulation piece of the new curriculum aims to broaden the 1L program’s
perspective from the essential, but by today’s standards incomplete, focus
on private law topics and common law reasoning that had dominated the 1L
curriculum since 1873.1 Leg-Reg (as the students call it) instead focuses on
statutes and the regulations that implement them. The course emphasizes not
only the interpretation of those materials, but also the lawmaking process,
institutional context, and political dynamics that shape the production and
interpretation of statutes and regulations. As then-Dean Kagan reported in
2008: “Through intensive work with statutes and regulations from the start
of law school, [first-year students] are developing rich understandings of the
institutional frameworks and modes of the regulatory state—and they and their
professors have been happy to find fertile connections between these materials
and the rest of the first-year program.”2 Like other elements of the new first-year
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See Bruce Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C.C. Langdell,
1826-1906, at 208–09 (2009). Of course, some of the traditional 1L courses—most notably
Civil Procedure and Criminal Law—were not common law, private law courses. But the main
substantive law courses other than criminal law—Contracts, Torts, and Property—were very
much in that vein.
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Elena Kagan, From the Bag: The Harvard Law School Revisited: Reflecting on Louis D. Brandeis’s
Harvard Law School Reflections 11 Green Bag 2d 475, 478 (2008).
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curriculum, Leg-Reg has gained broad acceptance among not only Harvard
Law School 1Ls but also the faculty who teach in the 1L program.3
This essay will discuss three aspects of the Harvard experience with
Legislation and Regulation: Part I will provide a brief description of the
extensive curricular reform process that produced this and two other new
1L courses. Readers more interested in the substance of the Legislation and
Regulation course than the process that led to its creation can safely skip
this section. But because reforming the 1L curriculum is such a daunting
process, and because many people have asked us in various forums about the
background of our reforms, we have included a discussion of the context and
process from which the course emerged.
Part II will discuss the course’s strategy for fitting novel and somewhat
different techniques, materials, and concepts into the 1L setting. In particular,
it will use materials from the statutory interpretation (“Leg”) component of
the course to illustrate the main features of its pedagogical approach. Most
of the HLS Leg-Reg faculty made a self-conscious decision to construct the
course so as to parallel, in two senses, the design of the more familiar 1L
course. First, the course tends to follow the familiar, case-oriented approach—
relying on appellate opinions and notes and comments on those opinions
as the main course materials and the focus of the discussion. Thus, while
the course incorporates many topics and methods that are touched on only
tangentially, if at all, in other 1L courses (such as textual exegesis, legislative
procedure, and public choice theory), it does so by asking students to learn
and assess concrete, real-world legal decisions and then building out, through
note material, to the broader concepts implicated by the cases. This strategy,
moreover, is facilitated by the availability of quite a number of well-known
statutory interpretation cases that present simple, intuitive, accessible fact
patterns from many different areas of law; these accessible cases offer students
a basis for developing an understanding of the intricacies of the legislative
process, an interpretive tool kit, and a judicial philosophy. Second, the version
of the Leg-Reg course developed here is transsubstantive, rather than focused
on a particular policy area. Part II elaborates on this pedagogical approach by
discussing how we present some of the key cases on statutory interpretation.
Part III of this essay will focus on the administrative law (“Reg”) component
of the course. Here, we will discuss how the two elements of the course (“Leg”
and Reg”) can be profitably integrated, and we also address two common
concerns about teaching administrative law in the first year. The first such
concern is that administrative law is simply too complicated for 1Ls. We have
found, however, that an immersive approach to statutory interpretation in
the first section of the course prepares students to tackle the issues raised by
the administrative law materials, both in terms of substance and method. A
familiarity with foundational interpretive tools and methods proves invaluable
3.

For several years running, Legislation and Regulation’s mean and median Overall
Effectiveness of Course evaluations have consistently been among the top half of such scores
for 1L courses.
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when discussing, for example, questions of constitutional interpretation that
arise when considering separation-of-powers controversies, issues concerning
the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),4 and, of course,
matters involving the Chevron doctrine.5 Likewise, familiarity with controversies
over the legitimate role of courts, the strengths and limitations of different
lawmaking processes, and related matters help frame the larger themes and
problems in administrative law. A second concern about putting administrative
law in the first year is how doing so affects the upper-level curriculum, in
particular the upper-level Administrative Law course. This is a legitimate
concern, as Leg-Reg is no substitute for a full course in Administrative Law.
Here, as we detail below, we are happy to report that the Harvard experience
has been positive: Though enrollment in Administrative Law has dipped
somewhat, a large proportion of our students treat Leg-Reg and upper-level
Administrative Law as complements rather than substitutes, and indeed the
existence of Leg-Reg has enriched the upper-level Administrative Law course
and related public law offerings.
Between the two of us, we have taught this course more than ten times.
Much of what follows builds on our own experiences in the classroom. Since
we helped develop the course we teach, and coedit the casebook we use,6
readers will want to discount what we say for any bias that may result. But
for the reasons we lay out in Parts II and III, both of us have found that the
course does what it set out to do.
I. The Kagan-Minow Committee and Reform of the First Year
At Harvard, as at most other U.S. law schools, the first-year curriculum had
looked the same for about six generations. When Elena Kagan first became
dean in 2003, the staples were the same as when she started law school in 1983
–Civil Procedure, Contracts, Criminal Law, Property, and Torts.
Then-Dean Kagan convened a Committee on Educational Innovations,
chaired by then-Professor, now Dean Martha Minow.7 The committee
consulted widely among “faculty, practitioners, alumni, law students and
people at other law schools.”8 It also considered curricular innovations “at
business, medical and policy schools[,]” as well as “other attempts at reforms
in legal education, including those that had been unsuccessful.”9 As Dean
Kagan described the net result of the committee’s study, it was “[n]ot that
legal education is broken,” but rather that there were “significant gaps and real
4.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2012).

5.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

6.

John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation (2d ed. 2013).

7.

Besides Professor Minow, the committee’s members were Professors William Alford, Scott
Brewer, Allen Ferrell, Jerry Frug, Todd Rakoff, and Alvin Warren.

8.

Elaine McArdle, A Curriculum of New Realities, Harv. L. Bull., Winter 2008, at 18, 21.

9.

Id.
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room for improvement.”10 And the stakeholders surveyed showed remarkable
agreement on areas in need of improvement.
The committee concluded that the traditional first-year curriculum had
three major needs to be filled. First, in an increasingly interconnected world
in which law practice entails a greater international component, students
should have an early introduction to international or comparative law.11 The
faculty implemented this recommendation through the adoption of a required
1L international or comparative course that students select from a menu of
offerings. Second, the committee found that the 1L curriculum would profit
from a course that was designed to simulate the experience of working in
teams to develop client-oriented solutions to a range of problems outside of
a courtroom setting. The faculty responded by adopting a Problem Solving
Workshop for the newly created 1L Winter Term. Third, and most relevant here,
the committee concluded that in a world in which much law takes the form
of statutes and regulations rather than common law precedents, a course on
Legislation and Regulation was imperative. The idea behind each of these
innovations was not merely to improve the first year, but also to provide a
firmer foundation for the second and third years of law school.
Reform of that magnitude is never easy. As noted, Dean Kagan herself
acknowledged that the old 1L curriculum “still work[ed] remarkably well in
honing many forms of legal analysis[.]”12 And there were legitimate questions
about the opportunity costs of these curricular changes, as the proposed reform
entailed reducing the “big five” traditional courses from five to four credithours each. Especially on a large faculty like Harvard’s, curricular innovation
produces a range of views. Law professors, moreover, are not particularly shy
about expressing and pressing differences of opinion.
Ultimately, however, the faculty voted unanimously to adopt the committee’s
proposal. Several factors contributed to this outcome. First, the Committee
on Educational Innovations did its homework. As then-Dean Kagan later
reported, the committee’s process “took us around the world to meet with
alumni, professors, and practitioners”13 about how to equip a 21st-century
lawyer. Second, the committee did a lot of listening and consulting with the
faculty to build consensus. Over the three years leading up to the adoption
of the new 1L curriculum, the dean convened a number of preliminary faculty
meetings to think about the shape of the reform and the impact on existing
courses. She also held a series of dinners at her home with faculty from various
fields. At these dinners, faculty discussed the broad outlines of curricular
reform, as well as the particulars of the various proposals that were being
developed. Third, by 2006, it had become impossible to deny the reality that
our legal system is increasingly structured by statutes and regulations, that the
10.

Id.

11.

See id.

12.

See Kagan, supra note 2, at 477.

13.

Id.
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economy and practice of law are ever more global in dimension, and that the
profession now expects new lawyers to hit the ground running in a way that
had not always been the case.
Some wondered why HLS should opt for a relatively novel 1L course such
as Leg-Reg14 rather than an old staple like Constitutional Law. The committee
opted for Leg-Reg over Constitutional Law for good reasons relating to the
core objective of the reform. As one committee member reported to us, the
committee determined that Leg-Reg simply added more value to the first year
because “constitutional law, for all its subject-matter interest, is in the end
fundamentally a case-interpretation, build on precedents course, replicating
skills already developed in contracts, torts, etc; whereas Leg/Reg develops
another whole set of skills needed in the modern state.”15 Perhaps because of
the strong tradition of the Legal Process course at Harvard Law School,16 LegReg was not a hard sell.
The next step in the process was to work out the details of what, exactly, the
courses should look like. The 2006 faculty vote approved the creation of the
Leg-Reg course, but had done so in fairly general terms; the course description
that the faculty approved stated:
This course will introduce students to the world of legislation, regulation,
and administration that creates and defines so much of our legal order.
At the same time, it will begin to teach students about the processes and
structures of government and how they influence and affect legal outcomes.
The course will introduce students to and include materials on most or all
of the following topics: the separation of powers; the legislative process;
statutory interpretation; delegation and administrative agency and practice;
and regulatory tools and strategies. The course will naturally lead into,
and enable students to get more out of, advanced courses in the 2L and 3L
years on legislation, administrative law, a wide range of regulatory subjects
(e.g., environmental law, securities law, and telecommunications law), and
constitutional law.17
14.

NYU had already adopted a first-year course very much like what we were contemplating,
but there was relatively little experience with this kind of 1L offering.

15.

E-mail from Todd Rakoff, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to the authors (Nov. 7, 2014, 15:06
EST) [hereinafter “Rakoff email”] (on file with authors).

16.

See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law (1958). In the post-New Deal period, Harvard
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks had pioneered the Legal Process materials that
framed the way many thought about legislation for generations. The Legal Process looked
at all law, including legislation and regulation, from the perspective of “institutional
settlement.” Id. at 54. The basic idea of the course was that people might differ greatly about
the answer to contested social problems but agree, in broad terms, to “duly established
procedures” for finding the answers to those problems. Id. at 4.

17.

Memorandum from the Curricular Innovations Comm. to the Harvard Law Sch. Faculty 3
(Sept. 26, 2006).
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To make this concrete—to determine what was in and what was out, and to
allocate material between Leg-Reg and the upper-level Administrative Law
course—Dean Kagan and Professor Minow put together a working group
consisting of the faculty who would likely be teaching the course the first
time out (including the two of us).18 After circulating syllabi from our existing
regulatory/public law courses, we met as a group multiple times to decide
what the course should look like. There was a range of views on some matters
but consensus on others.
In deciding what was in and what was out, we were guided by several
overarching principles about the relationship of this course to the rest of the
curriculum. First, the course had to address a different problem and teach
a different skill set from the primarily common law courses that were the 1L
staples. Obviously, the “common law” courses address statutory questions
—including the Uniform Commercial Code in Contracts, zoning and fair
housing statutes in Property, and the Model Penal Code in Criminal Law.
But those courses focus primarily on common law reasoning, and not on the
systematic exploration of interpretive techniques or the legislative process
questions that lie at the heart of Leg-Reg.19 Second, the course had to have
a scope that a 1L course could realistically cover. Hence, it could not cover
all of the material in the upper-level courses from which its core would be
drawn. Third, Administrative Law was to be preserved as a central element of
the upper-level curriculum. Although we did not achieve complete consensus
on topical coverage, we constructed a “guidance document” that divided the
(many) topics we’d discussed into three categories: those that should definitely
be covered (in some way) in the 1L Leg-Reg course; those that should not be
covered in the 1L course (but rather reserved for the upper-level Administrative
Law course); and those that were optional.
Our main conclusion was that the course should focus tightly on the
enactment and interpretation of canonical regulatory texts—statutes and
regulations. This focus entailed, first, a unit that emphasized the adoption
and interpretation of legislation. Next, because we thought it less satisfying to
try to teach about regulations without providing an introduction to the larger
issues surrounding the administrative state, we determined that the course
should include an introduction to the nondelegation doctrine, congressional
control over the regulatory process, and presidential authority to appoint and
18.

The other members of this committee were Professors David Barron, Jody Freeman, Todd
Rakoff, Mark Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule.

19.

Leg-Reg also may inform discussion of the issues in those classes. As our colleague
Charles Donahue recently reported about his first-year Property class:
My kids this year do not have LegReg until next semester. I pretty much had to
explain all of [the interpretive] issues [raised by zoning and planning]. In 2012, when
I gave the same classes, the kids were taking LegReg simultaneously, and it showed.
They were much better at coming up with the issues themselves.
E-mail from Charles Donahue, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to John F. Manning (Nov. 13,
2014, 15:40 EST) (on file with authors).
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remove regulators. Finally, the course would introduce certain foundational
administrative law topics, including the notice and comment rulemaking
process, judicial review under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard, and the
Chevron doctrine.
In addition to our deliberations about topical coverage, our working
group spent some time discussing the overall construction of the course, and
issues of pedagogical strategy, more generally. Here, we all agreed that there
are many ways to teach a successful Leg-Reg course that covers the essential
topics, and that the pedagogical discretion of individual instructors must be
respected. Nonetheless, our deliberations about course design were extremely
helpful. For example, as we will discuss in more detail in Part II, we spent
considerable time talking about the most effective way, in a 1L course, to
introduce challenging topics like the intricacies of the legislative process,
leading theories of regulation, interpretive theory, and the political economy
of governmental institutions.
II. Integrating Leg-Reg into the 1L Curriculum:
Statutory Interpretation as the Gateway
One of the main challenges in designing the Leg-Reg course was figuring
out how to make complex material both interesting and accessible to a broad
range of 1Ls coming to the topic with very disparate levels of experience and
skill in the subject. Indeed, one of the main objections to the creation of such a
course was that this material would be too dry, too abstract, too unfamiliar, and
too complicated for 1Ls. Happily, that has not been our experience. Several
factors—not least of which is the availability of a number of simple, intuitive
building-block cases—have contributed to the accessibility of the course for
our first-year students. Four such factors stand out as particularly important to
the success of the course.
First, although there was and remains some variation in the philosophy of
teaching Leg-Reg at Harvard,20 the modal approach has been to make Leg20.

Our colleague Mark Tushnet, for example, teaches a course that focuses more explicitly on
the philosophy and justification of administrative regulation. He describes his approach as
follows:
I teach “Legislation and Regulation” from a book with the title “The Regulatory and
Administrative State,” because I think that the final word in that title better captures
my pedagogical aims. Our students live in a regulatory and administrative state, and
to be equipped to work as lawyers in that state, they need a distinctive set of tools. For
me those tools fit into a general category, comparative institutional analysis, and that
category organizes the way I teach the course. I regard the course as a modernized
version of the classic Hart & Sacks “Legal Process” class.
E-mail from Mark Tushnet, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to the authors (Oct. 7, 2014, 18:01
EST) (on file with authors). In addition, while using the same materials as the two of us do,
Einer Elhauge frames his teaching to “emphasize[] that because statutory interpretation
(whether textualist or purposivist) can at best result in probabilistic statutory meaning,
one can understand many tools of statutory construction as default rules, thus linking the
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Reg appear as much like a traditional 1L course as possible, in particular
through the use of the case method. Students read statutory interpretation
cases, structural constitutional cases, and administrative law cases, and then
explore the surrounding concepts in the context of evaluating the judicial
decisions. In the design of new materials—initially undertaken by the authors
of this essay in consultation with other prospective 1L Leg-Reg teachers at
Harvard and elsewhere—the strategy was to supply substantial and largely
modular note materials that use the cases as a jumping-off point to explore the
broader concepts raised by statutory interpretation, the legislative process, the
design of regulatory institutions and regulatory policy.21
Second, the version of the Leg-Reg course developed here is transsubstantive.
We have found that teaching recurring interpretive questions across a range of
subjects enables Leg-Reg students, through immersion, to develop a firm set
of intuitions about how different tools of construction work and about their
legitimacy. By focusing on contexts as diverse as civil rights litigation, corporate
law, environmental law, criminal law, immigration, telecommunications, public
health, international affairs, or what have you, students have an opportunity
to see how common techniques apply across a wide array of problems and
topic areas. Indeed, one of the points we want to get across in the course
is that the legal tools and principles introduced in Leg-Reg are themselves
transsubstantive, and can apply in a diverse range of settings. (This has the
collateral benefit that students learn a bit—just a teaser—about a whole range
of statutory and regulatory schemes.) So, much as a Contracts class will cover
core concepts by looking at contracts cases in a range of settings (employment
contracts, commercial contracts, sales contracts, etc.), Leg-Reg works well by
covering core concepts in a range of substantive contexts.
Third—and something that we did not fully anticipate—the legislation part of
the course supplies a strong entry point into the course overall. It turns out that
many of the canonical statutory interpretation cases not only are accessible,
but also introduce key themes and concepts that enable students to tackle
more complicated materials in the latter part of the course, when they turn to
the administrative state and the regulatory process. The energy in the statutory
interpretation part of the course has also been enhanced by the simple fact that
there has been so much intellectual activity in the area in the past generation22
course to the parallel issues that arise about the interpretation of contracts in the contract
law course.” E-mail from Einer Elhauge, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to the authors (Nov.
13, 2014, 14:24 EST) (on file with authors).
21.

This approach contrasts, for example, with that of Columbia Law School’s Foundations
of the Regulatory State course (which used to be a mandatory 1L course, and is now an
elective). Though the Columbia course’s objectives overlapped in many respects with the
objectives of the Harvard Leg-Reg course, the Columbia course materials de-emphasized
cases and instead explored topics such as theories of regulation, distributive justice, costbenefit analysis, and market failure, largely through case studies that emphasized the full
arc of development of regulatory frameworks from the identification of the problem to the
enactment of legislation to the implementation of the regulatory framework.

22.

See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of

Reform of the First Year

53

—and, from a pedagogical perspective, this has proved a boon.23 Both judicial
opinions and scholarly writing provide considerable fodder for exploration
of the theoretical and practical aspects of interpretation24—in a way that is
accessible and appropriate for 1Ls.
Fourth, we—and most of the other Leg-Reg teachers at Harvard—made
the potentially controversial choice to try to find cases, especially for the
first several class sessions, that are not so politically charged, and where the
debates among the judges or Justices do not map neatly or predictably into a
conventional left-right ideological dispute. We worried that leading off with
high political salience cases might lead students too often to gravitate to a
particular interpretive theory because it corresponds, in the case at hand, to
a preferred outcome in a contested political dispute. After all, most people
gravitate toward a political ideology of some sort before they have developed
a view of interpretive methodology or legal theory. (Not to put too fine a
point on it: We didn’t want our “conservative” students deciding that they
were textualists, and our “progressive” students deciding that they were
purposivists, within the first week of class, before they’ve really thought deeply
and independently about the issues involved.) Even without lightning rod
issues, however, it turns out that there are plenty of cases that are fun to teach,
that provoke strong but conflicting intuitive reactions among the students,
and that allow productive further exploration of the deeper principles that
inform an interpreter’s decision.
Irving Younger, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 199 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1992).
23.

Indeed, in the wake of the renewed scholarly interest in the field, several important new
Legislation casebooks emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislation (1988); Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, Legislative Process
(Brown & Co. 1995); William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation (1993).

24.

Legal scholars, political scientists, economists, and linguists have debated an ever-growing
array of statutory interpretation questions. The literature is too large even to give a brief
summary of all the issues debated today. They include: How reliable are the stated views
of legislative committees or other pivotal actors in determining legislative intent? See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction
(1991); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 115-17 (2006); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 3 (1994). Do legislatures even have intentions? See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 859 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 284,
284 (1992). What do legislative drafters know—and how do they behave—when they draft
legislation? Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev.
901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725,
781 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 581 (2002). By the standards of linguistics, do courts do a
good job of reading statutory texts? See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive
Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1563–68 (2014); Lawrence M. Solan,
Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the Court?, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1069,
1073–79 (1995).
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Lest this all sound too abstract and general, we will try to illustrate our
approach with three examples, drawn from topics that we introduce in the
first month of the course: how courts should resolve clashes between the
letter and spirit of the law; how to determine the meaning the words used in
statutory and regulatory texts; and the legislative process and its relationship
to statutory interpretation (including the use of legislative history).
A. The Letter of the Law versus the Spirit of the Law
Every theory of interpretation requires both a theory of legislation and
a theory of adjudication.25 Accordingly, an important goal of the Leg-Reg
course is to help students develop a judicial philosophy—to think about
the fundamentals of legislative supremacy, the role of the courts, and the
relative place of statutory text and legislative intent and purpose in statutory
interpretation. Since the development of such a philosophy requires students
to think about complex questions of separation of powers and jurisprudence,
one might think this goal a tall order for first-semester 1Ls. To our surprise, 1Ls
quickly develop fairly clear senses of what they think. There is almost always a
range of views and room for classroom debate. And student opinions change
in all directions as the exploration of cases helps them hone their intuitions
about how legislatures work and about the appropriate role of courts in our
system of government. In part, they are helped by the existence of interesting
and accessible cases that raise precisely these issues.
One of us, for example, leads off with United States v. Kirby,26 in which a federal
district attorney had indicted a county sheriff (Kirby) for “knowingly and
willfully obstruct[ing] or retard[ing] the passage of the mails.” What makes
the case so interesting is that the sheriff did stop the mail carrier (Farris) just
as he was about to board a steamboat with his mail. But Kirby did so only in
order to execute a duly issued warrant for Farris’ arrest for murder. The case is
valuable because almost every student in the class instinctively recognizes that
there is something very awkward about enforcing the statute in this situation.
But it’s not so easy to explain why. Some years, astute students will zero in
on what “knowingly and willfully” means. Some will notice that “willfully”
must mean something different from “knowingly.” Some will look the terms
up in Black’s Law Dictionary and see that “willful,” at least, has a specialized legal
meaning that implies some form of “bad motive or purpose.”27 This permits a
preliminary exploration of how a word or phrase takes on a specialized legal
meaning, and when, and why, we should care.
But since the Court’s reasoning assumes that the statute is clear but absurd,
the case also offers students a larger question: What should a court do when
a statute makes little sense as written? Even though the students cannot
25.

See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 593–94 (1995).

26.

74 U.S. 482 (1868).

27.

Black’s Law Dictionary 950, 1737 (9th ed. 2009).
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imagine a reason Congress would want Kirby to go to jail for arresting Farris,
the challenge for the class is to state a generalizable principle supporting
that result. The Court makes it more fun by proclaiming that if Sheriff Kirby
had been serving civil rather than criminal process, it would have furnished
“no justification for the arrest of a carrier of the mail.”28 These dicta open up
all sorts of interesting avenues of exploration. What about detaining a mail
carrier to quarantine him or her? To execute a subpoena to testify at a criminal
trial? To address a misdemeanor, such as speeding, jaywalking, or driving
without a license? (All of this, by the way, opens up avenues for discussing
other forms of legal process for the 1Ls). The Court helpfully emphasized
that in the case of an arrest warrant for murder, “[t]he public inconvenience
which may occasionally follow from the temporary delay in the transmission
of the mail caused by the arrest of carriers upon such charges, is far less than
that which would arise from extending to them the immunity for which the
counsel of the government contends.”29 This observation invites students to
consider where the Court gets the authority to conduct cost-benefit analysis
in determining the meaning or scope of a statute. The instructor then has a
chance to introduce the inevitable problem of statutory overgenerality—and
to begin to explore the question of how the interpreter might devise a rule of
decision to cut back on overbroad statutes.
Simpler cases like Kirby nicely lay the groundwork for more complicated
examples of the conflict between statutory text and apparent statutory
purpose, such as West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.30 In Casey, the Court
concluded that the text of a statute authorizing recovery of a “reasonable
attorney’s fee” did not extend to the fees paid to experts who assisted the
attorney in preparing the case. Since the Court majority found the text to be
clear, the majority did not care that background evidence of legislative purpose
pointed squarely in the opposite direction. Casey and other modern cases clearly
illustrate both the costs and benefits of adhering to the text of a statute when
the interpreter confronts strong evidence of a contrary legislative purpose.
Casey also anticipates the challenges lawyers face when dealing even with
seemingly simple terms. The determination of what constitutes a “reasonable
attorney’s fee” raises nice questions of how to ascertain meaning in context. Is
it the hourly billing of a lawyer? Is it a customary fee for representation that
includes items such as paralegals, messengers, photocopying, and Westlaw
charges? Is it something else? The case also puts into sharp relief the process
questions that arise in the choice between text and purpose. Does textualism
have any superior claim to capture legislative compromise? Does it permit
Congress to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion more precisely? Or does it
play “gotcha” with a busy legislature that is prone to make mistakes and that
cannot anticipate all that will arise down the road? Students have strong and
diverse instincts about these issues—which makes the questions raised by these
28.

Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486.

29.

Id.

30.
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cases highly teachable.
B. The Meaning of Words
A course on legislation must consider communication and theories of
language. Again, there are good ways to make this potentially daunting subject
intuitive to 1Ls. For example, few cases are as much fun to teach as Nix v.
Hedden31—which asks whether, for purposes of the tariff laws, a tomato is a fruit
(untaxed) or a vegetable (taxed at ten percent). It turns out that a botanist
might consider a tomato to be a fruit (because it is the seed-bearing part of the
tomato plant), but to a grocer, or to the person at the dinner table, a tomato is
a vegetable. The case—which takes up less than a page in the casebook—allows
the instructor to introduce complexities into the idea of “plain meaning.” It
permits students to consider the fact that language depends on the practices
of a social and linguistic community, of which there are many—including the
person in the street, scientists, building contractors, human resources officials,
and, of course, lawyers. And the meaning of words will vary depending on
whether one attributes to them a specialized or ordinary meaning. Nix tells us
that the default is the language of the layperson and that there must be good
reason to shift to that of the specialist.
Like almost all of these cases, Nix also presents deeper issues that instructors
may choose to explore. For one thing, if the specialist and layperson have
different understandings of a term, should courts treat that variation as a
form of ambiguity that invites or even necessitates consideration of legislative
purpose? More generally, how does one identify and flesh out a term of art?
Does the technical meaning of a term of art trump background evidence of
purpose? What role does colloquial meaning play in all of this? Additionally,
more adventurous instructors can explore the possible relevance in this case
of the “tariff canon,” which is a judge-made presumption against applying a
tariff in cases of doubt—and which nicely sets up the discussion of canons of
construction to come later in the course.
As was true with the text-versus-purpose materials, one can build from
simpler, older cases like Nix to the more complicated and theoretically involved
discussions in more recent cases like Smith v. United States,32 which asks whether
someone “use[d]” a firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking
offense” when he traded a gun for cocaine. Such cases raise questions about
the Court’s use of dictionaries, about the trigger for finding ambiguity, and
about the problem of how to make sense of a case in which interpreters
disagree about “plain meaning.” Students come away from these cases with a
good working sense about the art and limitations of textual exegesis. Often,
because this unit informs their sense of whether there ever is a “plain meaning”
to enforce, it will shade back on the question of letter and spirit of the law.
31.

149 U.S. 304 (1893).
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508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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C. The Legislative Process and Legislative History
As other contributions to this symposium emphasize, a first-year LegReg course should help students understand the legislative process and how
it relates to statutory interpretation.33 The challenge here is that abstract
or general discussions of the legislative process can be dry and somewhat
inaccessible, particularly for those students without much background
in American politics. Again, we have found that the best way to make this
material come to life is to use intuitive, accessible cases in which the resolution
of the interpretive question requires careful attention to legislative process
questions. Blanchard v. Bergeron34 is a prime example. In that case, the Court
majority relied in part on a Senate committee report to determine the scope
of the “reasonable attorney’s fee” that a prevailing civil rights plaintiff may
recover from a defendant under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976.35
At issue was whether the recovery under that fee-shifting statute was limited
by the contractual amount that the plaintiff had agreed to pay his or her
lawyer under a contingent fee agreement. In holding that such a contract did
not cap the recovery of a “reasonable attorney’s fee,” the Court treated the
Senate committee report as authoritative evidence of the intended meaning
of that term. Justice Scalia wrote a stinging separate opinion asserting that
no legislator had any idea of what was in the committee reports and that
legislative staffers almost surely slipped those cases in the reports solely in
order to influence judicial interpretation.
In a few short pages, a case like Blanchard introduces a simple, straightforward
legislative history problem that will provoke different intuitions in different
students. Some think a committee report obviously sheds light on legislative
intent. Others see such legislative history as a transparent way to make an end
run around the legislative process. From that starting point, the accompanying
materials permit the instructor to engage students on a cluster of issues
about the legislative process. It permits discussion of the role of legislative
committees, and consideration of evidence about whether legislators and their
staffs are more likely to read statutory texts or committee reports, and whether
that matters. The dispute in Blanchard, moreover, calls attention to questions
raised by political scientists about the role of committees in the legislative
process: Do such committees, in practice, operate as agents of the majority
who face effective sanctions if they misrepresent the majority will?36 To what
degree can one expect a typical committee to reflect the composition—or, at
least, represent the interests—of the chamber from which it is drawn?37
33.

See Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker & Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in Legislation, 65 J.
Legal Educ. 70 (2015); Deborah A. Widiss, Making Sausage: What, Why, and How to Teach About
Legislative Process in a Legislation or Leg-Reg Course, 65 J. Legal Educ. 96 (2015).
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489 U.S. at 91-92.
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Other interpretation cases provide opportunities to explore other aspects of
the legislative process, along with the implications for statutory construction.
For example, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill38 requires students to think about
the implications of committee jurisdiction, as well as the distinctive roles of
authorizing legislation and appropriations legislation. What is a court to do
when appropriations committees earmark funds for a public works project
whose completion seems to be prohibited by earlier substantive legislation
originating in a different set of committees? How, if at all, should the division
of jurisdiction between appropriations and substantive committees help the
Court decide how to sort out the conflicting signals?39 The famous Continental
Can decision,40 in turn, introduces students to the practice of “bulleting” floor
statements.41 What should an interpreter do when a bill sponsor places his
or her authoritative interpretation of the bill into the Congressional Record...but
does so (under accepted rules of practice) only after the chamber has voted
to pass the legislation? And since Gustafson v. Alloyd Company, Inc.42 instructs us
that “identical words used in different parts of the same statute are intended
to have the same meaning,” anyone teaching that case must examine with
students whether such “consistent usage” canons correspond to the empirical
realities of legislative practice.43 The list goes on.44
In our experience, using this case-based approach to teaching complex
material about the legislative process has worked well for 1Ls. Building out
from cases makes potentially abstract and sometimes dry process questions
more concrete and immediately relevant to legal novices. Rather than ask 1Ls
to examine freestanding excerpts of often-voluminous legislative or regulatory
materials, the case approach invites them to wrestle with legislative practice,
staff attitudes, inter-branch dynamics, and other process questions in realworld controversies that sharpen the issues and define the stakes. Besides
offering a format that is more familiar to 1Ls, this method makes it immediately
apparent why students should care about process details that might seem arcane
to the uninitiated (such as planned colloquies, the special role of conference
committees, and the idiosyncrasies of the appropriations process). Although
38.
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See Manning & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 17–18.
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Continental Can Co., Inc. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union, 916
F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990).
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513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332,
342 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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See Manning & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 224–26.
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there are many good ways to teach about the legislative process,45 we have
found that the cases we have used help make unintuitive material intuitive
to our 1L audience get them engaged and stir debate about how the (oftendivided) opinions should have come out.
* * * * *
In short, to address the concerns that a 1L Leg-Reg course would prove too
abstract, complex, or otherwise inaccessible for first-year students, most (though
not all) of us teaching the course at Harvard have employed the following
strategy: (1) use something resembling the familiar case method; (2) select
cases spanning a range of substantive policy areas; (3) open the course with
the legislation/statutory interpretation material, which is more immediately
accessible and lays the foundation for the more complicated material to come
later; and (4) start with cases that provoke strong intuitive reactions from
the students, but that (when possible) do not tend to trigger pre-existing
political or ideological commitments. The course’s premise is that students
will develop a knowledge base, a practical skill set, and a judicial philosophy
by being exposed to lots of cases that raise diverse issues in recurring ways in
distinct settings. We have attempted to illustrate this approach with a handful
of examples that, we hope, show how one can introduce both the legislation
material and the broader themes of the course.
It is important to keep in mind that in a methodology course—in a course
about the art of interpretation—no case will involve only one issue. Each case
may have a primary focus, but it is surprising how many issues—word meaning,
legislative history, semantic canons, structural inference, judicial role, etc.—
come up repeatedly as incidental parts of a case whose main focus and payoff
are something else. Though that can be a challenge in some respects, it is
also a virtue: Students get to see common issues presented again and again
in different ways, in different areas of law, with different policy and political
valences. At times, they will see a tool deployed in a way that produces a result
in line with their policy instincts. At other times, that same tool will produce
results that disappoint them. The immersion in cases also allows students to
see the way different techniques work in combination and develop a sense
of how to deploy them in the holistic way that interpretation necessitates.
Finally, students also have an opportunity to develop a view of the reliability
45.

In addition to our book, a growing array of casebooks have been designed or adapted for a
1L Leg-Reg course. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward L. Rubin & Kevin M.Stack,
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and efficacy of different techniques they are seeing in a variety of contexts.
Is the statutory text really more constraining than the legislative history? Or
can a willful judge manipulate either? By the end of the interpretation unit of
the course, students have developed a good sense of the available tools and
how to deploy them, of the institutional stakes, and of their own philosophies
of judging, which typically span a broad spectrum and migrate in different
directions for different people during the semester. At the conclusion of the
Legislation part of the course, students also have the skills and instincts
necessary to take on the complexities presented by the Regulation part that
follows—and to which we now turn.
III. Regulation
One of the distinctive features of the Harvard Leg-Reg course—and other
similar courses offered at, for example, NYU and Vanderbilt—is the integration
of statutory interpretation (“Leg”) and administrative law (“Reg”) into a single
course, rather than simply moving the existing Legislation or Administrative
Law courses into the 1L curriculum. The inclusion of an introduction
to administrative law in the 1L year was deemed important because of the
centrality of administrative regulations to modern law and legal practice.
Moreover, the HLS Committee on Educational Innovation and the working
group that designed the Leg-Reg course believed that the integration of the
statutory interpretation and administrative law materials would enhance the
students’ understanding of each, and would allow for a more comprehensive
exploration of common themes.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the introduction to administrative law in the
1L course presented its own set of challenges. It would clearly be foolish to try
to cram all of Legislation and Administrative Law into a single 1L semester.
Rather, the objective for Leg-Reg was to give students a basic foundation in the
regulatory apparatus so that the students could hit the ground running, as 2Ls,
in courses such as Environmental Law, Labor Law, Securities Regulation, and
the upper-level courses in Administrative Law and Legislation. Our judgment
was to zero in on the aspects of administrative law that are (1) fundamental to
understanding the basic structure of the administrative state and the nature of
regulation; (2) most likely to come up in the upper-level public law courses for
which Leg-Reg supplies the prerequisites; and (3) accessible to first-semester
1Ls who have had the “legislation” component of the Leg-Reg course but have
not yet had, say, Constitutional Law.
These considerations led us to emphasize four general topics in
administrative law (though, again, each instructor approaches these topics
in a different way, and organizes the material somewhat differently). First,
we thought it important to give students a sense of the constitutional and
policy controversies surrounding the very existence of the administrative
state, and the practice of congressional delegation of lawmaking power to
administrative agencies. Second, we build on that theme by introducing students
to controversies surrounding the control of agencies by the political branches,
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including appointment and removal of agency officials and other forms of
potential presidential and congressional control of agencies. Third, the course
introduces students to the procedural framework for agency lawmaking,
focusing in particular on the notice-and-comment rulemaking process under
the APA, as well as “hard look” judicial review of agency rules under the
APA’s “arbitrary or capricious” standard. Fourth, the course links the material
on administrative law with the earlier material on statutory interpretation by
spending a fair bit of time on judicial review of agency statutory interpretation
(covering Chevron doctrine and related topics).
Although we worried about the accessibility of such material to 1Ls, we
have found that the foundation in statutory interpretation gives students a
feel for analyzing both the constitutional and statutory issues that frame the
modern administrative state, as well as a working knowledge of legislative
and interest group dynamics. By midsemester, 1Ls steeped in legislation have
ample tools to process such questions. We will again try to make this all a
bit more concrete by selecting a handful of examples to illustrate how the
Leg-Reg course approaches each of the four major administrative law topics
outlined above, and then say a few words about how the introduction of LegReg has affected the upper-level Administrative Law course, as well as the
upper-level public law curriculum more generally.
A. The Delegation Problem
We have found that the best way to introduce the administrative law
component of the course is to focus on constitutional and policy questions
about the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies. This
works quite well, for three reasons.
First, after the students have spent several weeks learning about the
important role of statutes in the contemporary legal universe, and also about
the difficulty of passing new statutes, the instructor can introduce the fact
that many statutes do not actually specify primary conduct rules, but rather
empower an agency, department or commission to make such rules. Getting
the basic point across is not hard, and there are many examples to use (such
as the rule against insider trading, or most federal environmental regulations).
One can point out that such rules ultimately originate in a constitutional
grant of the lawmaking power to Congress (such as the power to “regulate
Commerce...among the several States”46), but that Congress sometimes
chooses to exercise that power not to prescribe a rule of conduct, but to
authorize an agency to do so under specified criteria.47 Students see that the
agency rules adopted pursuant to these statutes look, feel, and operate just
like a statute (and that in some cases can result in criminal sanctions against
46.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe as
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someone who violates the agency rule). Even before getting to the legal issues,
many students are instinctively distrustful of this practice, while others will
offer a spirited defense of delegation.
Second, the constitutional nondelegation cases—like J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States,48 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,49 and Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations50—allow the instructor to introduce some basic issues in
constitutional structure and constitutional interpretation. For most students,
this will be their first introduction to structural constitutional law. But, having
spent several weeks thinking, at least indirectly, about the constitutional
lawmaking process, and gaining familiarity with some standard interpretive
techniques (textual exegesis, structural inference, etc.), students can absorb
this material.51 The cases here allow students to grapple with the question of
how one identifies the borders among different constitutional powers. (For
example: Is rulemaking an example of “executive” or “legislative” power?)
The topic also introduces students to all sorts of more general questions about
constitutional interpretation, including the relationship between constitutional
text and constitutional structure and the role historical practice and pragmatic
considerations should play in determining constitutional meaning,
Third, even though students quickly learn that the Supreme Court no longer
enforces a meaningful constitutional nondelegation doctrine, the material
on delegation nicely sets up the rest of the administrative law material in the
course. Instructors can periodically return to the basic tension introduced by
this material–the desire to balance the virtues of delegation (speed, expertise,
flexibility, a healthy insulation from politics) against the vices (arbitrariness,
unlawfulness, evasion of constitutional safeguards, loss of democratic
accountability)—and frame much of the rest of our administrative law as an
effort to reconcile this tension.
B. Political Control of Administrative Agencies
A natural next topic after delegation is congressional and presidential
control of agencies—topics like the legislative veto, appointment and removal
of agency officials, and presidential and congressional oversight of agencies
more generally. Although some of the more skeptical members of the HLS
working group that developed the Leg-Reg course feared this would be too
much for 1Ls to handle, we have found that it works quite well once the
48.
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groundwork has been laid by the earlier parts of the course. Separation of
powers cases—cases like Chadha,52 Humphrey’s Executor,53 and Morrison v. Olson54—
might seem daunting, but they follow naturally from the nondelegation cases,
both thematically and methodologically.
Thematically, these cases allow one to explore more deeply the tension
between, on the one hand, wanting agencies to have a healthy insulation from
partisan politics, and, on the other, fearing a lack of democratic accountability.
They also allow one to raise questions such as: If Congress chooses to delegate
broad policymaking authority to other branches, what strings may it attach to
the exercise of those powers? What control does Congress legitimately exercise
over delegated power? And is there any practical difference between formal
(and proscribed) instruments of control, such as the legislative veto, and more
informal (and permissible) means, such as oversight hearings, appropriations
strings, confirmations, and the like?
Methodologically, the separation of powers cases nicely build on the
delegation cases because they again raise issues of constitutional interpretation,
and of the constitutional structure more generally. As was true in the statutory
interpretation section of the course, here the most effective way to introduce
seemingly complex material is to start with the more straightforward cases
—the nondelegation cases—and then build on that foundation to the more
complicated material. And because many of the separation of powers cases
involve questions of textual exegesis, these cases provide opportunities for
cumulative work on the skills and understandings developed earlier in the
course.
C. The Rulemaking Process
Clearly a course that purports to introduce students to administrative law
must cover the APA. But how much? And what parts? Covering as much of the
APA as is typically covered in an upper-level Administrative Law course is not
feasible. Working out what the APA component of the Leg-Reg course should
include—and what should deliberately be left to the upper-level course—was
one of the most challenging questions faced by those of us who participated
in the design of the HLS Leg-Reg curriculum. While there is some variation,
most of us nonetheless reached consensus that the Leg-Reg course should: (1)
provide a brief introduction to the APA and its origins; (2) focus primarily
on notice-and-comment rulemaking; (3) include some discussion of the main
alternatives to rulemaking and controversies over their legitimate scope; and
(4) introduce students to so-called “hard look” review under the “arbitrary
or capricious” standard in §706(2)(A) of the APA. In discussing the noticeand-comment rulemaking process, instructors can profitably draw on material
from earlier in the course, in several ways.
52.
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First, the prior discussion of the controversies surrounding delegation is
quite useful here, as one can frame the APA as an attempt to mitigate the
vices of delegation, while preserving its virtues, through proceduralization. Here,
a recurring theme—which instructors can bring out, and which provokes
strong reactions among the students—is the tension between concerns about
over-proceduralization (manifest in cases like Florida East Coast Railway,55 Vermont
Yankee,56 and Pacific Gas & Electric57) and concerns about under-proceduralization
(manifest in cases like Nova Scotia,58 Hoctor,59 and State Farm60). In the context
of discussing procedures as a response to concerns about arbitrariness, lack
of accountability, and potential agency overreaching, a teacher can also draw
out instructive comparisons between the agency rulemaking process and
the congressional lawmaking process that students studied in the statutory
interpretation part of the course.
Second, because so many of the cases on the APA rulemaking process are,
at least formally, statutory interpretation cases—about how the APA’s various
provisions ought to be construed—students can draw on (and be urged to
draw on) the material from the statutory interpretation section of the course
when thinking about, for example, how to construe the APA’s rulemaking
requirements, and how to make sense of open-ended terms such as “arbitrary
[and] capricious.” Often, the doctrinal interpretive questions and the
normative institutional design questions go hand in hand.
For example, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Nova Scotia—a leading case
on the so-called “paper hearing” requirement—raises difficult questions about
interpretive theory and about agency lawmaking dynamics. Despite the
APA’s self-consciously relaxed notice requirements for informal rulemaking
(requiring that the agency need only state “the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved”61), the Nova
Scotia court held that, in promulgating a rule for the sanitary preparation of
various smoked fish, the Food and Drug Administration erred by failing to
release the “scientific data” upon which it proposed to rely.62 And although
the APA only requires that a final informal rule needs to be accompanied by a
“concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.”63 The Nova Scotia
court held that when an agency issues a rule, the accompanying explanatory
55.
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materials must respond in detail to any comments of “cogent materiality.”64
Although these new requirements seem hard to square with the APA’s text, the
court famously used pragmatic and structural arguments to reach its result.
Pragmatically, the court emphasized that the APA requires notice and comment—
and that comments would not be very meaningful if the public did not know
the material facts upon which it was commenting. Second, under the APA’s
judicial review provisions, the court had to determine if the agency rule was
“arbitrary and capricious,”65 a duty that the court could not fulfill if the agency
did not give detailed responses to the material comments submitted by the
parties.
The court’s interpretive moves stimulate many questions by and for the
students. The court in Nova Scotia—and in many of the other APA cases we
cover in the course—adopted a purposive, dynamic approach to reading the
APA, heavily influenced by pragmatic considerations (and at least arguably
untethered, or only loosely tethered, to the text of the statute and the original
understanding of how it would operate). Assessment of that approach again
requires students to revisit issues they wrestled with in the “Leg” part of the
course, but does so in a way that also requires students to focus on the regulatory
dynamics of the administrative state. Quite often students find their earlier
intuitions about statutory interpretation unsettled by the APA materials: Some
students who gravitated toward more purposivist or pragmatic approaches
feel instinctively that courts in cases like Nova Scotia went too far; there are
also usually some students who self-identified as textualists who would make
an exception for the APA. Thus, the discussion of the APA is enriched by the
students’ exposure to interpretive theory, and vice versa. Nova Scotia and other
cases in this line also raise interesting questions about the political history of
the APA and the nature of legislative compromise.
Furthermore, Nova Scotia, along with the landmark Supreme Court decisions
in Vermont Yankee and State Farm, provide opportunities to explore broader
questions about the appropriate judicial role in overseeing agency decisionmaking. For example, the class can discuss the hypothesis that the paper hearing
requirement was in part a reaction to research suggesting that agencies might
be “captured” by those they regulated. On that view, courts responded by
insisting upon greater transparency by agencies and more robust checks upon
agency lawmaking by a relatively independent judiciary. This naturally leads
into questions not only about the plausibility of the “capture” hypothesis, but
about which parties benefit most from greater proceduralization, and whether
judges are well-qualified to make judgments as to what procedures would be
most suitable. These cases also allow the instructor to introduce concepts such
as the “ossification” of rulemaking, the judicial administrability of the “hard
look” review approach, and, more generally, about the transaction costs of
agency lawmaking, and about the limits of judicial competence.
64.
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D. Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation: It All Comes Together
The Chevron66 material neatly brings together themes about statutory
interpretation, the delegation of interstitial lawmaking power, and the
allocation of constitutional authority among different branches of government.
Although different Leg-Reg instructors teach the Chevron material at different
points in the syllabus, the two of us, and some of our colleagues, have found
that it’s a great way to pull the course all together at the end.67 After all, the first
section of the course introduces students to the foundational themes, tools,
and controversies in statutory interpretation, and the second section of the
course introduces students to questions about the appropriate role of agencies
and the tension between the desires to empower and to constrain agencies; the
Chevron material combines those two topics, neatly closing the circle.
Indeed, teaching Chevron at the end of Leg-Reg is in some ways easier—and
more rewarding—than teaching that material in an upper-level Administrative
Law class that lacks a significant standalone statutory interpretation
component. This is because many of the most interesting and important
Chevron questions involve the relationship between Chevron deference and other
tools and techniques of statutory construction, and the Chevron unit allows
the instructor to return to those issues again, but in a different context. (This
has the collateral benefit of providing some review of the material from the
beginning of the course—which 1Ls nervous about finals generally appreciate,
particularly if the instructor points this out.) But the instructor can also
continuously integrate into this discussion themes and questions that were
introduced in the earlier administrative law materials, particularly questions
about how much of a role courts should have in overseeing agency decisionmaking.
Again, there are many ways to cover this material, but one of us has found it
is particularly helpful to take the issues covered in the statutory interpretation
unit, and then move through the same issues, in the same order, in the Chevron
context, explicitly drawing the parallels as the course proceeds. For example,
suppose in the statutory interpretation unit, the instructor chooses to cover: (1)
textual/semantic interpretation (dictionaries, etc.); (2) purposive/structural
interpretation; (3) legislative history; (4) specialized terms of art; (5) semantic
canons of construction; and (6) substantive canons of construction (say, the
constitutional avoidance canon). Then, in the Chevron unit, after spending a
class or two on Chevron itself, the instructor can proceed to cover: (1) Chevron
and “plain meaning” (MCI v. AT&T68); (2) Chevron and purposive/structural
66.
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interpretation (FDA v. Brown & Williamson69); (3) Chevron and legislative history
(many possibilities, but perhaps easiest to do with hypothetical variants on
MCI and Brown & Williamson); (4) Chevron and specialized terms of art (Babbitt v.
Sweet Home70); (5) Chevron and semantic canons (Babbitt again); and (6) Chevron
and the constitutional avoidance canon (DeBartolo and Rust v. Sullivan71). For
each “Chevron and ____” component, one can press the students on the extent
to which Chevron makes a difference to the outcome. This entails thinking about
both the underlying question of statutory interpretation and the degree to
which courts should accept agency interpretations with which they disagree.
E. The Impact on Upper-Level Administrative Law
As noted at the outset, a worry about the introduction of a 1L Leg-Reg
course is the impact on the upper-level Administrative Law course. There
are actually two concerns here. First, it might seem challenging to design an
upper-level course that is both interesting and thematically coherent if so much
of the basic administrative law material—delegation, notice-and-comment
rulemaking, hard look review, and Chevron—has been covered in the first year.
Second, student interest in upper-level Administrative Law might plummet if
the students perceive Leg-Reg as a substitute. Happily, at HLS neither fear
has been realized.72
First, with respect to the content of the course, it turned out to be much
easier than expected to design an effective, coherent upper-level Administrative
Law course that would serve as a follow-on to Leg-Reg, going into more topics
and in greater depth than would be possible in a standalone Administrative
Law course. Although different instructors approach the upper-level course
differently, there are some common themes that those of us who teach the
upper-level course generally incorporate. First, the upper-level course devotes
considerable attention to issues related to administrative adjudication—a topic
for the most part deliberately left out of 1L Leg-Reg. These topics include
the Due Process issues, the APA provisions on administrative adjudication,
agencies’ obligations to follow their own precedents, and the like. Second, the
upper-level course typically revisits issues related to agency legal interpretation
(including a brief review of Chevron), but covers a broader range of more
sophisticated issues, including the relevance, if any, of agency interpretive
inconsistency and prior judicial interpretations of the statute (both issues raised
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in the Brand X case73), the issues of Chevron’s domain (or “step zero”) raised in
Mead,74 statutes administered by multiple agencies, and agency interpretation
of the agency’s own regulations (Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine75). Third, the upperlevel course introduces various ways that agencies engage with outside parties,
besides through participation in the adjudicative or rulemaking procedures.
Here, the course typically covers transparency statutes like the Freedom of
Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as well as issues
related to sub-delegation or privatization of agency functions. Fourth, the
upper-level course covers issues related to access to the courts: standing (both
statutory and constitutional), exhaustion, ripeness, and statutory preclusion
of judicial review.
Second, with respect to student enrollment, although fewer students now
take Administrative Law than was the case when Leg-Reg did not exist,
enrollment in upper-level Administrative Law remains substantial, with two
to four sections needed every year to satisfy student demand.76 And those
students who do enroll in the upper-level course are especially interested in
the material and committed to the course. The result is that now all of our
students get a basic exposure to administrative law, and those of our students
who have a particular interest in the field—say, those who want to work in
fields where government regulation is especially important—have at least two
semesters of administrative law, and consequently know much more about the
topic than, frankly, either of us did when we graduated from law school.77
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world in which so much lawmaking takes the form of enacted texts—
whether statutory or regulatory—it is hard to deny that a course that focuses on
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seen it in 1L year generally profit from a second exposure.
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E-mail from Jody Freeman, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to the authors (Nov. 13, 2014,
12:56 EST) (on file with authors).
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lawmaking dynamics and textual interpretation is foundational. The question
is not whether it would be good for 1Ls to learn what this course has to offer.
To us, the question was whether the materials were intuitive and accessible
enough for them to do so. In contrast with much about Contracts, Criminal
Law, Property, or Torts, there is relatively little about legislative procedure,
notice-and-comment rulemaking, deference, and the like that is intuitive to
students—that resonates with experiences they have had in life. But, in our
experience, the course can be made accessible, in part, by building out from
cases or controversies—real-life issues that cut across many areas of law and
many kinds of human experience—to the questions of theory and process that
frame the decisions. Both of us have found that, if structured in that way, the
course works, both for the students and for us.

